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1

New Evidence on the E˙ect of Technology on Employment and Skill Demand

A central question in the debate on the future of work is: What are the e˙ects of advanced technologies on
employment and skill demand? Two ideas often dominate the conversation. The frst is that technologies
replace workers (the Luddites; Keynes 1931; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). The second is that technologies increase the demand for skills and can increase inequality—this is called the skill-biased technological
change hypothesis (Griliches 1969; Welch 1970; Tinbergen 1975). Current research suggests that advanced
technologies such as robots and ICT have been skill biased (Katz and Murphy 1992; Krusell et al. 2000;
Autor et al. 2003; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Akerman et al. 2015; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020). But the
evidence is limited because both measuring and identifying the e˙ects of technologies are diÿcult.
This paper presents novel evidence on the e˙ects of advanced technologies on employment, skill demand,
and frm performance using new large-scale data and quasi-experimental designs. The context is manufacturing frms in Finland, 1994–2018. We focus on new production technologies, such as robots and computer
numerical control (CNC) machines. Our novel data directly measure technologies, employment, and skills
and track frms and workers over time. The main research design focuses on a technology subsidy program
that induced sharp increases in technology investment in specifc frms. The program provides direct funding
for technology investment and is part of the European Structural and Investment Funds—one of the world’s
largest industrial policy programs. Our design compares close winners and losers of the technology subsidies
using an event-study approach. We use novel text analysis methods on the application text data to compare
close winners and losers (meaning that the frms had similar evaluation reports) and measure specifc technological changes (Roberts et al. 2020). We complement our quantitative analysis with feldwork: observing
factories and interviewing CEOs, managers, workers, and subsidy administrators.
* Access the research papers at economics.mit.edu/grad/tuhkuri/research. The frst chapter is co-authored with Johannes Hirvonen
(Aalto University) and Aapo Stenhammar (Aalto University). The second and third chapters are co-authored with Ramin Izadi (Aalto
University). The fourth chapter is solo-authored.
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The frst part of the paper reports results in sharp contrast with the ideas that technologies necessarily
reduce employment or are skill biased. Technology investments induced by the subsidy program led to
a 23% increase in employment, on average. But there were no di˙erential changes in typical measures
of skill bias: share of highly educated workers, average years of education, or production workers’ share
of employment. Zooming in to more detailed measures of skill composition—education and occupation
groups, cognitive performance, and personality—we fnd generally zero e˙ects. Several observations support
the validity of our fndings. The subsidy program induced a strong frst stage: the frms showed a sharp
rise in investments in technologies after winning technology subsidies. The frms had similar pre-trends in
investment, employment, and skill composition before applying. Our results are robust to controlling for the
evaluation texts of the subsidy applications using text analysis and other controls, including industry, frm
size, and region trends. The results also hold when using alternative designs: a comparison to a matched
non-applicant control group, a separate regression discontinuity (RD) design based on changes in the criteria
defning a priority for small frms, and an event-study design without the subsidy program (Bessen et al.
2020). Our feldwork supports these fndings on the factory foor.
The second part of the paper explains the result that technologies did not replace workers or increase
skill demand. To understand the fndings, we outline a theoretical framework that contrasts two types of
technological change: process versus product. The framework builds on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Melitz
(2003); we apply the ideas to a new context. Process refers to a productivity increase within an output
variety, whereas product refers to expanding to new varieties. These two views predict di˙erent e˙ects and
can be tested empirically. The distinction is whether frms use new technologies to do the same thing at
lower costs or do new things. The model clarifes that technologies may not necessarily be about changing
the production process to replace workers or increase the demand for skills but creating new types of output.
For example, automation is a process change, while the innovation of new goods is a product change (Klette
and Kortum 2004; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018).1
Based on the theoretical interpretation, we provide novel evidence documenting that the frms used
technologies to create new products and services, not replace workers. Direct evidence shows that technology
adoption led to more revenue, new products, and export growth. Text data from the subsidy program show
that 91% of the frms described new products, response to changing demand, and other similar reasons
for their technology investment. For example, the piston manufacturer included in the feldwork invested
in a new CNC machine and a robot to manufacture new, more e˙ective pistons. Survey data from the
EU’s Community Innovation Survey (CIS) corroborate our observations: typical reasons for frms’ process
and product innovations are access to new markets, expanding product selection, and better quality—not
typically to replace workers. We show the results also hold without the subsidy program, indicating that
our results are more general.
To understand when and why to expect process versus product changes, we contrast two types of manufacturing: mass production (Taylor, 1911; Ford, 1922) versus fexible specialization (Piore and Sabel 1984;
1 The concepts of process and product refer to the uses of technologies rather than physical types of technologies. Process,
which is the idea that technological change lowers production costs, embeds the standard versions of labor replacement and
skill bias. Conversely, product, which is the idea that technological change creates new output varieties, is present in standard
growth models (Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1992) and in the management literature
(Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Porter 1985).
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Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Mass production combines standardized products, high volumes, and process
advances. Flexible specialization combines specialized products, low volumes, and product advances. While
the two ideas—labor replacement and skill bias—are widely accepted and used in the literature, research also
recognizes that not all technological changes are labor replacing or skill biased. Most importantly, Piore and
Sabel (1984) argue that a di˙erent set of technology–labor relations emerge in fexible manufacturing, most
visible in technologically advanced small- and medium-sized enterprises that produce specialized products
in small volumes to a changing market. In that context, and ours, the scope for specialization, low production volumes, and need for adaptation make it less proftable for frms to commit to the long-production
runs of mass production and the fxed costs of process advances.2 But our fndings may not apply to
non-specialized commodities, such as cement or steel, or high-volume assembly, where costs are critical. At
the same time, the literature documents that manufacturing has widely evolved from mass production to
fexible specialization (Dertouzos et al. 1989; Berger 2013).3
Two descriptive facts help position our fndings into a broader context. First, the backdrop of our
study is that the overall direction of manufacturing, including our treatment and control groups, is toward
greater skill demand, seen in, for example, the rising share of educated workers. Because the skill trends
are consistent with the rest of the world (Acemoglu and Autor 2011), we could have expected to fnd that
new technologies were driving them at the frm level—but we did not. Our fndings point to explanations
for these skill trends other than the direct e˙ects of adopting new technologies. Second, a critical aspect
is that technology adopters are di˙erent from non-adopters. Growing frms typically invest in technologies,
with and without subsidies. Our main design contrasts growing frms that plan to adopt new technologies.
One frm gets the subsidy, the other does not, and that induces di˙erences in technology adoption. This
has two implications: 1) Our estimates capture the local average treatment e˙ect (LATE) for frms close to
investing in technologies. 2) Pre-screened but non-winning applicants provide a better control group than
generic non-applicant frms because they have expressed an interest in technology adoption.
How broadly do the results apply? Our evidence is from Finland, where we can quantify the e˙ects with
high-quality data and research design. But the input we received from managers working in di˙erent contexts
was that our observations apply more broadly in industrial manufacturing. There are still limitations. Our
results do not directly apply to non-physical technological advances such as digitization or the internet,
management practices such as lean manufacturing, R&D, technological advances in oÿces, historical eras,
or the future. Our results and explanation focus on a frm-level mechanism. We do not exclude that microlevel technology could lead to macro-level skill bias or labor replacement (Oberfeld and Raval 2021). We
also do not claim that work does not change: our qualitative evidence suggests it does, but that change
does not imply labor replacement or skill bias by education, occupation, or cognitive performance.
Because our results challenge the two major ideas in the literature—that technologies replace labor or
increase skill demand—it is critical to compare them to earlier research. We make two methodological
contributions: We are the frst to study the e˙ects of technologies in manufacturing using a direct frm-level
2 Klette

and Kortum (2004) and Akcigit and Kerr (2018) also relate the type of frm and innovation.
research noted these changes frst in Northern Italy, Germany, and Japan (Piore and Sabel 1984). Currently,
the majority of Northern European manufacturing could be characterized as fexible specialization. For example, 90% of
manufacturing employment in Finland is in non-commodity production under the Rauch (1999) classifcation. Bils and Klenow
(2001) also document that US consumers have shifted away from standardized goods.
3 Early
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quasi-experiment, and our measurement is a major advance over earlier work because we directly measure the
critical objects: technology, employment, and skills. Our results di˙er from the theoretical literature because
it has focused more on process advances in mass production (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018), while product
advances are more common in our context. Our results are consistent with the non-quasi-experimental
empirical studies that focus on similar technologies in manufacturing frms (Doms et al. 1997; Bartel et
al. 2007; Aghion et al. 2020; Dixon et al. 2021; Koch et al. 2021) and qualitative evidence (Berger 2020).
Complementary and simultaneous work by Curtis et al. (2021) documents that capital tax credits that
favor capital investment raised labor demand in US manufacturing based on industry-level exposure. One
interpretation is that their study detects similar local e˙ects in the frontier sectors: their e˙ects appear
the largest in capital-intensive, skill-intensive, and robot-intensive subsectors of manufacturing. Potentially,
capital subsidies made to frontier sectors are generally not applied to labor savings but rather market-share
expansion among di˙erentiated goods producers.4
Our analysis also contributes to the literature on industrial policy. We provide new estimates for one
policy: a lump-sum transfer to increase technology adoption in manufacturing frms. The estimates help
understand the broader question in growth and trade policy: What types of policies help frms grow?
(Rodrik 2007). We fnd that the frms in our context use subsidies and technologies to achieve growth.
To do so, they often scale up from idea to production. Our quantitative estimates suggest that 1 euro in
technology subsidies led to 1.3 euros of technology investment. A typical EUR 100K subsidy led to 2.3 new
jobs over the next 5 years. The cost per job was EUR 43K, close to the literature’s average (Criscuolo et
al. 2019).5

(a) CNC Machine and a Robot.

(b) Machine Operators and a Milling Machine.

Figure 1: Fieldwork: Documenting the Context.

4 Empirical studies also fnd di˙erent e˙ects when focusing on 1) di˙erent types of technologies (especially digital technologies—the internet in Akerman et al. 2015 and ICT in Gaggl and Wright 2017), 2) replacement e˙ects (Bessen et al. 2020), and
3) macro-level comparisons (Lewis 2011; Michaels et al. 2014; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020).
5 Recent research on industrial policy include Becker et al. (2010), Cerqua and Pellegrini (2014), Howell (2017), Criscuolo
et al. (2019), Giorcelli (2019), Curtis et al. (2021), Howell et al. (2021), and Lane (2021). Technology subsidies and taxes are
also actively debated (Acemoglu et al. 2020; Costinot and Werning 2020; Guerreiro et al. 2021).
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Figure 2: The E˙ect of Winning a Subsidy on Machinery Investment and Employment.
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Notes: Event-study estimates comparing the winners and losers of technology subsidies. Event time τ = 0 refers to the
application year. Panel (a): The outcome is investment in machinery and equipment (in EUR 1000s) measured from the
fnancial statement register. The estimate for τ = 1 indicates that the treatment group invested EUR 60K more than the
control group in the year after subsidy application. The estimates indicate a cumulative EUR 130K e˙ect on machinery
investment. Panel (b): The outcome is employment relative to the base year τ = −3, in percentages. The estimates indicate
approx. 20% increase in employment. The results are robust to various controls.



'LIIHUHQFHLQ'LIIHUHQFHV(VWLPDWH5HODWLYHWR%DVHOLQH
'LIIHUHQFHLQ'LIIHUHQFHV(VWLPDWH3HUFHQWDJH3RLQWV

Figure 3: The E˙ect of Winning a Subsidy on the Firm-Level Skill Composition.
Notes: Di˙erence-in-di˙erences estimates. The estimates indicate no detectable changes in the skill composition at the frm
level. Education is measured as a relative change (%) in the average years of education in the frm between τ = −3 and the
average of τ ∈ [2, 5]. The shares are measured in percentage-point changes. The right-hand side reports means at τ = −3.
The specifcations include two-digit industry and frm size as controls.
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Psychological Traits and Adaptation in the Labor Market

This paper investigates which personality traits and skills help workers to deal with a changing environment.
Labor markets are in constant change. Our work empirically documents how responses to labor-market
shocks vary by individuals’ psychological traits. To do so, we construct novel measures of cognitive ability,
extraversion, and conscientiousness using standardized personality and cognitive tests administered during
military service to 79% of Finnish men born 1962–1979. We analyze establishment closures and mass layo˙s
between 1995–2010 and document heterogeneous responses to these shocks.
Classic theoretical research in economics emphasizes the value of skills, not only applied to tasks, but
also in adapting to change (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Welch, 1970; Schultz, 1975). But little is known about
these adaptation processes more specifcally. The restricted-access military data of this paper are globally
unique and allow a novel contribution to the literature.
The main fndings are that extraversion is the strongest predictor of adaptation: the negative e˙ect of a
mass layo˙ on earnings is 20% smaller for those with one standard deviation higher scores of extraversion.
Conscientiousness appears to have no di˙erential impact conditional on other traits. Cognitive ability and
education predict a signifcantly smaller initial drop in earnings but have no long-term advantage. Our
fndings appear to be driven directly by smaller dis-employment e˙ects: extraverted and high cognitiveability individuals fnd re-employment faster in a similar occupation and industry they worked in before.
Extraversion’s adaptive value is robust to controlling for pre-shock education, occupation, and industry,
which rules out selection into di˙erent careers as the driving mechanism.
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Figure 4: The Labor-Market Premia to Psychological Traits Before and After a Mass-Layo˙.
Notes: Each point is a regression coeÿcient for the indicated factor variable, measured in standard deviations. For example,
the green line in the frst panel shows that in period three, extraverted individuals (one standard deviation above the sample
mean) have about 2 percentage points smaller earnings losses from a mass layo˙ than individuals with average traits. The
outcome in the left panel is earnings, in % relative to the base year, the outcome in the right panel is employment.
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3

School vs. Action-Oriented Personalities in the Labor Market

Extensive evidence shows that noncognitive skills improve labor-market success, but the channel is incompletely understood. This paper explores how di˙erent dimensions of personality predict school vs.
labor-market performance, and how the value of these traits changed over time. We answer these questions
using data that includes multidimensional personality and cognitive test scores from mandatory military
conscription for approximately 80% of Finnish men.
We document that some dimensions of noncognitive skills are productive at school, and some dimensions
are counterproductive at school but still valued in the labor market. Action-oriented traits (activity, sociability, and masculinity) predict low school performance but high labor market performance. School-oriented
traits, such as dutifulness, deliberation, and achievement striving, predict high school performance but are
not independently valued in the labor market after controlling for school achievement.
Importantly, we further document that the labor-market premium to action-oriented personality traits
has rapidly increased over the past two decades. To interpret the novel empirical results, we outline a
model of multidimensional skill specialization. The model and evidence highlight two paths to labor-market
success: one through school-oriented traits and formal skills, and one through action-oriented traits and
informal skills.

0.15
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Coefficient
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School−oriented
0.05

0.00
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Cohort

Figure 5: Time Trends in the Returns to Personality Traits.
Notes: The labor-market premium to action-oriented personality traits has rapidly increased over the past two decades, and
the premium to school-oriented traits have declined. Each point in the fgure corresponds to a regression coeÿcient
separately for each cohort, with log earnings as the outcome and person as the unit of observation. The action-oriented trait
is a composite of the personality sub-traits Sociability, Activity, and Masculinity. The school-oriented trait is a composite of
the personality sub-traits Deliberation, Dutifulness, Achievement aim, Confdence, and Leadership. These variables are
normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 within cohorts. These right-hand-side variables contain the
action-oriented and school-oriented traits simultaneously. Earnings are recorded by the tax authorities and measured by
averaging total labor and entrepreneurial income earned at age 35-38. Robust standard errors are reported as the shaded area.
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The Surprising Intergenerational E˙ects of Manufacturing Decline

This paper analyzes the impact of manufacturing decline on children, and contributes to understanding the
long-term future of work. To do so, it considers local employment structure—characterizing lost manufacturing jobs and left-behind places—high-school dropout rates, and college access in the US over 1990–2010.
To establish a basis for causal inference, the paper uses variations in trade exposure from China, following
its entry to the WTO, as an instrument for manufacturing decline in the US.
While the literature on job loss has emphasized negative e˙ects on children, the main conclusion of
this research is that the rapid US manufacturing decline decreased high-school dropout rates and possibly
increased college access. The magnitudes of the estimates suggest that for every 3-percentage-point decline
in manufacturing as a share of total employment, the high-school dropout rate declined by 1 percentage
point. The e˙ects are largest in the areas with high racial and socioeconomic segregation and in those with
larger African American populations.
The results are consistent with the idea that the manufacturing decline increased returns and decreased
opportunity costs of education, and with sociological accounts linking the working-class environment and
children’s education.

(a) Decline in the Manufacturing Share of Employment.

(b) Decline in the High-School Dropout Rate.

Figure 6: Geographical Trends in the Manufacturing Share and High-School Dropout Rate.
Notes: The same places faced declines in the manufacturing share of employment and in the high-school dropout rate.
Variables are in 100 × annual changes 1991–2011, measured in percentage points. Sources: CBP, US Census, and ACS.
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